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Uses of a Myth: al-Andalus
Abstract
In the last two decades, the Spanish press treatment of the Muslim world reflects a change of tone from
unsympathetic to enthusiastic, although the information is still marred by confusion and ignorance. This
change of attitude has occurred in other Western countries as well, and it is due in part to immigration
trends, control over oil resources, and the relativism of official discourses towards the Third World. In the
case of Spain, however, there is an additional internal element at play: the mass-media reinvention of a
mythical al-Andalus as a tolerant and pluralistic society. This idealized interpretation of seven centuries of
Muslim presence in the Iberian Peninsula is fraught with ignorance and distortion of the historical record
but is not new. The mystification of al-Andalus has its precedent in romantic accounts that saw in
“Muslim Spain” a differential fact that reinforced the exotic image of the country. It can be attributed also
to the strategy to “hispanicize” al-Andalus employed by Arabists and historians to make the subject
matter appealing to unsympathetic Spanish audiences conditioned by the myth of the Reconquest.
Intended or not, the manipulation of the myth of al-Andalus as a historical fact has ideological and
political implications that demand an objective and balanced consideration.
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Uses of a Myth: al-Andalus
Serafín Fanjul
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
(Translated by Margarita Pillado)
A review of the Spanish press of the eighties, especially in the early
part of the decade, reveals an evident confusion with the meaning of
concepts such as “Arab” or “Islam” motivated by ignorance and distrust, if not by ill-will. Rather than criticize the journalists and the
print media, I simply want to call attention to the existence of such
confusion. I focus on the printed press because it is easier to obtain
and analyze than radio, television broadcasts, or the digital press,
which was non-existent at the time. Broadly speaking, the attitude
towards all things Arab was unsympathetic and cautious. The Left
still remembered “Franco’s Moors” and the Caudillo’s “traditional
friendship” towards the Arab World. The Right, on the other hand,
continued to exploit with various degrees of conviction the image
of the medieval Moors of the Reconquest—the cruel and cunning
raiders vanquished by the Catholic Monarchs—independently of
the appropriateness or fairness of that image. Even average citizens,
more preoccupied with some of the domestic problems that Adolfo
Suárez, José Calvo Sotelo, and Felipe González appeared incapable
of solving—terrorism, economic crisis, unemployment, the first
stirrings of a breakdown of national unity—cautiously voiced their
concern at NATO’s denial of protection to the Spanish enclaves of
Ceuta and Melilla (F. Suárez de Oca 10), or at the “invasion” of Arab
money that was buying real estate, health centers, and even the will
of some powerful players in the Costa del Sol (Rosa Hernández 9).
Papers also reported the occasional news about some city officials’
budding outbursts of “racism”—carefully printed between quotation marks—such as the incident involving the mayoress of Boadilla
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(“La alcadesa de Boadilla” 19).
There was a background of deficient information and little intention of approaching the subject in a serious manner (as a point of
clarification, the current situation does not seem to have improved
much). In connection with the first Iraq war, for instance, Spaniards
were reading “Saddam Hussein es un sunita, es decir un musulmán
flexible” ‘Saddam Hussein is a Sunnite, that is, a flexible Muslim’
(Pedro González 6).1 Articles from a few years earlier were full of
inaccuracies, such as reducing to seven the twelve Shiite Imans or
confusing an Abbasid with a Ba’athist (Javier Valenzuela 8). We
could also read shocking and adulatory remarks related to the influence of Saudi money in some Andalusian towns: “lo malo no vino
con los árabes rubios de ojos azules, con la saga de los omeyas, sino
con sus acompañantes africanos” ‘the problem did not come with
the blond, blue-eyed Arabs, from the Omayyad saga, but with their
African companions’ (Pedro Crespo 16).
Declarations by novelist Alfonso Grosso that his book was more
sympathetic to Israel than to the Arab countries echoed this prevailing anti-Arab attitude: “diez años más de administración árabe de
Jerusalén hubieran terminado con todos los fundamentos arquitectónicos y paisajísticos de nuestra cultura judeo-cristiana” ‘ten
more years of Arab involvement in the administration of Jerusalem
would have destroyed all the architectural and landscape foundations of our Judeo-Christian culture’ (34). Statements by Pedro José
Ramírez expressed a similar mood when he advocated the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel in light of the historic animosity between Spain and “the Arabs” (referred therein as a bloc).
He supported his position with a comprehensive list of confrontations, rivalries, and bloodshed over the last century:
La Marcha Verde sobre el Sahara; el hostigamiento, captura y a
veces asesinato de nuestros pescadores; las amenazas continuas
de Hassan con relación a Ceuta y Melilla; la invención argelina
del problema de Canarias y su grotesca internacionalización; o –
por no prolongar demasiado la lista – el eficaz entrenamiento de
los terroristas de ETA en campos militares situados en Argelia,
Libia, Líbano y Yemen del Sur. … El mundo árabe es una realidad
cultural y religiosa, pero también una gran ficción política que
se esfumaría el mismo día que desapareciera el conflicto con los
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judíos … desde el desastre de Annual hasta la campaña de Ifni
el único pueblo que durante el siglo XX ha estado en guerra con
España ha sido el pueblo árabe.
The Green March over the Sahara; the harassment, capture and
the occasional murder of our fishermen; Hassan’s continuous
threats to Ceuta and Melilla; the Algerian invention of the Canary Islands problem and its grotesque internationalization; or—
not to extend the list too much—the efficient training of ETA
terrorists in military camps located in Algiers, Libya, Lebanon,
and Southern Yemen. … The Arab world is a cultural and religious reality, but also a great political fiction that would vanish
the same day the conflict with the Jews would disappear … from
the Annual disaster to the Ifni campaign the only people who
have waged war against Spain in the twentieth century have been
the Arab people. (3)

Contradicting his own thesis, Ramirez implies that “the Arab
world” is a unitary and collective entity, but this is not the case. It
is true that the Arab people enjoy a remarkable unity thanks to its
language and the uniformity brought about by Islam. However, as
Bassam Tibi explains in La conspiración ‘The Conspiracy,’ they live
in a political chaos continually reflected in the dreadful relations
among the Arab states:
El sentimiento de pertenencia y lealtad de la población sigue
refiriéndose a las tribus, estirpes y clanes y su clientela étnicoreligiosa, y no a estados nacionales sustancialmente existentes.
El concepto de “nación árabe”, que pretende abarcar a todos los
árabes, es tan artificial como las actualmente existentes fronteras
legales entre los estados árabes, trazadas durante y después de la
primera guerra mundial por las potencias coloniales francesa e
inglesa.
People’s feelings of loyalty and belonging continue to refer to
tribes, lineages, and clans and to their ethno-religious clientele,
not to the national states substantially in existence. The concept
of an “Arab nation” that claims to encompass the totality of the
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Arab people is as artificial as the legal borders currently existing
among Arab states drawn during and after World War I by the
French and English colonial powers. (86)

Hence, it can be surmised, that towards the end of Franco’s dictatorship and at the beginning of the eighties, Spanish society as
a whole was not pro-Arab. At best, it harbored a vague folkloric
attraction superficially related to a mythical Moor from an unspecified location—usually Southern Spain—that would envelop and
mask feelings of fear, distrust, repulsion, superiority, and in the best
of cases, a condescending paternalism that has found its place in
popular folkloric celebrations. However, if we opened a blank parenthesis in 1975 and closed it in 2005—as if awakening from a thirty-year coma—we would be quite surprised to read the following
announcement in ABC, a major Spanish newspaper of today:
El Castillo de Niebla albergará las ‘Veladas Andalusíes’, un programa de cenas amenizadas con música, danza y teatro de al-Andalus, que tienen como objetivo reproducir y recrear la cultura islámica que dominó la Península Ibérica durante ocho siglos. Las
veladas, que cuentan con el apoyo del Ayuntamiento de la localidad, incluyen en su edición de este año cuatro menús diferentes,
omeya, almorávide, almohade y nazarí y tendrán lugar todos los
domingos de julio y agosto a partir de las 22.30 horas.
The Niebla Castle will host “Andalusí Evenings.” Seeking to reproduce and recreate the Islamic culture that dominated the Iberian Peninsula for eight centuries, this dinner program features
musical entertainment, dance, and theater from al-Andalus.
Sponsored by the local town council, this year’s evenings include
four different menus—Ommayyad, Almoravid, Almohad, and
Nasrid—and will take place every Sunday during July and August
starting at 22:30. (43)

If we overlook the text’s linguistic and historical inaccuracies—there
was no such thing as theater in al-Andalus or such alleged gastronomical traditions—its joyful enthusiasm cannot be attributed
solely to an obvious tourist appeal. It reveals an opinion gone to
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol33/iss2/3
DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1700

4

Fanjul: Uses of a Myth: al-Andalus
Fanjul			

231

the opposite extreme of what we have commented on above, that
is, a consolidation and normalized acceptance—even with a sense
of elation—of human communities previously called into question.
In principle, the change would call for self-congratulation were it
not for some nagging questions immediately arising: has Spanish
society become Arab-loving? If so, what role have the mass media
and political powers played in this prodigious phenomenon? Have
the causes of resentment that have fed the historical mistrust towards the Arab disappeared from the cultural, religious, and political spheres of the country? What new factors have come into play to
arrive at the present state of affairs? Is this change a symptom of a
sincere attitude or a response to circumstantial pressures, especially
in relation to image?
Spain, as well as other Western countries, has been affected by
general factors that are transforming some attitudes towards the
Arab people and Islam: the demographic explosion of the Muslim
world, the subsequent migration that reaches Spain, the control
over oil resources by a good number of Islamic states, our nagging
conscience towards the Third World, and so on. But, similarly to
what occurred in the nineteenth century with the nostalgic resurrection of a mythical al-Andalus, there has also been a highly exploited internal element at play in the case of Spain that is absent
from other European countries (with the exception of Bosnia or
Sicily): the massive media-driven campaigns to revive the Islamic
past of certain regions of the country. In that regard, Spanish Television Channel 2 and Andalusian Canal Sur have reached delirious
levels of informational intoxication in their re-creation of a twentyfirst century version of Hispanic Islam adapted from a sweetened
and imaginary tenth-century model. They purposely ignore the
most decisive factor in the configuration of Spanish identity—the
defeat of Islam in the peninsula—and jump over everything that
has occurred during the last five hundred years that has affected the
personality, the collective psychology, the culture, the feelings, and
even the political enterprises of the Spanish nation.
The embellished image of an idyllic al-Andalus (frequently accompanied by the word “paradise,” or in Arabic, al-firdaws al-mafqud ‘the lost paradise’) where practitioners of the “three cultures”
and three religions lived in constant harmony is untenable and im-
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possible to substantiate with any factual evidence as shown in the
texts written by the people who lived at that time. al-Andalus was
neither better nor worse than the rest of the contemporary Muslim
world or Medieval Europe as far as moral categories are concerned,
which ought to be the basis on which to build the whole argument.
It enjoyed brilliant eras in certain arts—in architecture and in the
assimilation of certain techniques—and managed to transmit to the
rest of Europe the Hellenistic legacy received from the great cultural centers of the Orient (Nisapur, Baghdad, Cairo, Rayy), which
was no small feat. However, it was, first and foremost, an Islamic
country with all the implications derived from that fact. Even so,
its peripheral location constituted an insurmountable obstacle that
prevented al-Andalus from becoming the axis of anything in the
Muslim world. One thing is certain, however: as soon as al-Andalus
disappeared, it became the lost paradise mentioned above, a perpetual and tearful source of nostalgia and imaginary trips to nowhere,
with little or no connection to the Spain that, since the Middle Ages,
had been forming in a constant fight against peninsular Islam.
The mystification surrounding the concept of “al-Andalus” is
manifest and ubiquitous. As Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada explains,
once the political and social contexts of the late Middle Ages became
a thing of the past, the latent imagery they inspired contributed to
an idealized re-creation of al-Andalus based on circumstances that
were historically factual but “capaces de segregar desde el primer
momento sus propias fábulas” ‘capable of spinning their own fables
from the very beginning’ (221). In fact, one of the most serious and
frequent distortions regarding andalusí society and culture lies in its
implicit representation as a homogeneous and unaltered historical
continuum, as if the eighth-century invaders, Barbarians to the core
and only halfway converted to Islam, were actually notable scientists, architects, and pilgrim-poets who “brought” us this or that,
comparable to the Hispano-Arabs of four or five centuries later.
This confusion is the likely cause of copious anachronisms that
plague so-called “historical novels” that depict Abd ar-Rahman II in
the ninth century eating mangoes amid ornamental tiles and lush
gardens decked with bougainvilleas and prickly pears. These novelists do not seem aware that the arrival of tiles date from much later,
as do those exotic fruits and plants, which have nothing to do with
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol33/iss2/3
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Arabs, ancient or modern. The enumeration of similar examples
would be tiresome. The point is that political hegemony does not
necessarily imply similar cultural weight in every field, sublime literary delicacies, or great technical development (even as late as 960
geographer Ibn Hawqal made fun of the limited skills andalusíes
displayed with the stirrups).
Both al-Andalus and the Christian kingdoms were two antagonistic and mutually exclusive powers involved in a fight for survival
in radical and absolute opposition encouraged by two universal
religions whose design was to embrace no less than the whole of
Humanity. Clearly, if al-Andalus was to exist, Spain could not, and
vice versa, as it indeed happened when Christian society triumphed
and imposed a neo-Latin culture. Even if we decide to sing praises
to tolerance, to the exquisite sensuality of the fountains of the Generalife, or to the great freedom enjoyed by eleventh-century women
in Cordoba, we have to acknowledge also some historical facts that
may offend our sensitivity: social alienation and intermittent persecution of Christians; mass flights of those Christians to the North
until the twelfth century; forced conversions; mass deportations to
Morocco during the Almohad empire; anti-Jewish pogroms, such as
in Granada in 1066; repeated martyrdom of Christian missionaries
while beautiful rooms were being erected in the Alhambra. … Because history is the sum of all of this and from the general balance
of those cruel events we have to draw appropriate conclusions. It
is advisable to know the past and it is our duty to disseminate our
findings, but we should avoid falling into a trance while invoking
languid fantasies of yesteryear.
Understandably, the brutal, merciless, and obscurantist events
of that time offend the politically correct sensitivity of official Spanish discourse. The Arab chronicles yield numerous examples of a
kind of brutality that no politician currently in office would dare
read out loud for fear of bringing to the surface an awkward part
of the past that might blatantly contradict their official hallelujahs
to the glorious Caliphate of Cordoba. However, reality is the sum
of everything: “daba cuenta de que había arrasado el llano del enemigo y había talado los panes de los infieles, destruido sus bienes,
quemado sus casas y matado a cuantos cogió, tanto al entrar como
al salir el ejército se había apoderado de las cosechas de la ciudad
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de San Esteban, ¡Dios la aniquile!” ‘He reported he had devastated
the enemy terrain and had destroyed the wheat of the infidels, destroyed their property, burnt down their houses, and killed everyone he captured. Both entering and exiting, the army had seized
all the harvests from the city of San Esteban. May God annihilate
it!’ (al-Razi et al. 278); “irrumpió con ellos el chambelán Badr en
terreno enemigo, hollándoles los sagrados y asolando el país, con
la destrucción de cosechas, edificios y recursos … la fortaleza fue
tomada al asalto el 29 de julio de 920. … Los combatientes fueron
pasados a cuchillo, teniendo lugar su suplicio en presencia de anNasir [Abderrahmán III]” ‘Chamberlain Badr burst into enemy
territory with them, trampling down their sanctuaries, razing the
country, and destroying harvests, buildings, and resources … the
fortress was seized July 29, 920. … The combatants were put to the
sword, their punishment taking place in the presence of al-Nasir
[abd-ar Rahman III]’ (Ibn Hayyan et al. 117, 127).
This minimal anthology, showing us the other side of the coin,
does not imply a condemnation of al-Andalus or the passing of a
moral judgment—everyone acted in the same brutal manner. It represents an attempt to offer a more even-handed representation of
al-Andalus by stripping it of any exoticism and visceral reactions
either way. Inevitably, however, one could ask coldly whether the
return to the European (Greek and Latin) civilization was beneficial
to the Iberian Peninsula; whether we should have crushed and hidden the brilliant Roman past as it was done in North Africa; whether we should enjoy something of the many good things that in every
respect we have accomplished since 1492. One could also ask, on a
different note, whether there is any logic to the attitude of certain
Spaniards named López, Martínez, or Ruiz, who claim that their
true culture is Arab although they only speak Spanish and exhibit
the same phenotype as people from Santander or Asturias. If this
were not pathetic, it would be funny.
Another important element that must be addressed in the discussion of al-Andalus is the confusion with vocabulary and terminology, which must be clarified before going deeper into our analysis. I am referring in particular to conceptual mistakes created and
encouraged outside of Spain by the translation of certain Spanish
words in other languages, especially in French. The French adjective
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol33/iss2/3
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andalous has two distinct translations in Spanish: andaluz (inhabitant of or related to the current region of Andalucía ‘Andalusia’) and
andalusí (related to al-Andalus), which can be qualified further as
hispanoárabe ‘Hispano-Arab’ or hispanomusulmán ‘Hispano-Muslim.’ Also, in more general and popular terms, there is confusion with
the word moro ‘Moor,’ which up until the nineteenth century designated a “Muslim” or “an inhabitant of North Africa” without any pejorative connotations. But the prevalent use of andalous by French
writers and historians (our bridge to twentieth-century Europe) has
contributed significantly to the dissemination of an erroneous concept: the existence of a racial, social, cultural, and mental continuity
between andalusíes and andaluces. The confusion between al-Andalus and Andalusia has contributed to the interchangeability of the
term to the extent that even die-hard Andalusian politicians utilize
either word to mean the same thing. There are two major objections
to such an assumption. First, in Arabic, al-Andalus does not refer to
Andalusia but to Islamic Hispania, regardless of its reach—the river
Duero in the tenth century or Algeciras in the fourteenth century.
The second objection, as important as the first, further differentiates the territorial scope of Andalucía, for although the word dates
back to the Christian conquest of the Guadalquivir River valley in
the thirteenth century, it is not applicable to the region known today
as Andalucía until 1833, when Javier de Burgos divided the country
into the same administrative regions and provinces still in use today
and incorporated the territory known as Kingdom of Granada—
current provinces of Málaga, Almería, and Granada—to a larger administrative unit named Andalucía. Therefore, it is absurd to imagine an Andalusian motherland whose identity can be traced back to
the beginning of time, with Argantonio, the mythical Tartesian king
c. 1000 BC, dancing flamenco and Abd er Rhaman (any of them)
taking pleasure in the spirit of the future poetry of Federico García
Lorca. A purely administrative decision generated, artificially, an
identity concept. Andalucía, however, became the name of a territory different from the Kingdom of Granada, as proven repeatedly
by all the available administrative, historical, and literary documentation from the nineteenth century.
The same confusion can be observed in the use of the words
“Spain” and “Spaniards” applied to the historic region of al-Andalus
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and its inhabitants—a deplorable translation that is ideologically
charged, even if its promoters did not intend for it to be that way. In
a commendable effort to make the history and society of al-Andalus
more accessible to their readers, many nineteenth-century historians and Arabists, such as Reinhart Dozy and Évariste Lévi-Provençal used the concept of “Spain”—whose historical validity does not
start until the fourteenth century—to refer to al-Andalus without
taking into account that the former represents a political, cultural,
and social reality quite different from the latter; in fact, it represents its complete opposite. Expressions such as “Spanish Moors,”
“Spanish Arabs,” or simply “Spaniards” in reference to al-Andalus
Muslims are a common occurrence in historical writings even by
contemporary authors such as Pierre Guichard, Rachel Arié, and
Bernard Vincent. I do not mean to deny the inhabitants of al-Andalus a Spanish identification—neither good nor bad in itself. What
I want to stress is that they did not consider themselves Spaniards,
an identity they detested.
I am deeply aware of the difficulty of countering ideas so inimical to the image of Spain developed abroad, but I consider it my
obligation to do so, even if the task is unpleasant. The myth of alAndalus has been based on images repeated mechanically without
regard to verified and verifiable facts. Nineteenth-century French
and English travelers painted a petrified portrait of Spain, and of its
most “picturesque” region, Andalusia, that far from reflecting a coherent reality was an accumulation of the most shocking and exotic
elements for the benefit of those who flocked to the Peninsula eager
to experience the oddity of the environment. However, foreign travelers also witnessed other numerous and concrete realities they had
to acknowledge, albeit briefly and reluctantly, being as they were
too similar to their own context. Magic, mystery, and “true” typicality were the expectations every European traveler journeying south
over the Pyrenees wanted to see fulfilled. Thus, in 1872 Edmondo
de Amicis complained that the Spain he saw did not correspond to
the images and stereotypes so meticulously described by his predecessors:
“Alas!” I said to my companion, “how badly a high hat looks in
the streets of Cordova! How have you the heart to fasten fash-
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ion plates to this beautiful oriental picture? Why don’t you dress
like the Arabs?” Dandies, workmen, and girls passed. I looked
at them all with curiosity, hoping to find some of those fantastic
figures which Doré pictured to us as the representatives of the
Andalusian type; with the dark brown coloring, those thick lips,
and great eyes. I met none of them however. On going towards
the heart of the city, I saw the first Andalusian women, ladies,
young ladies, and women of the people … In their dress, with
the exception of the so-called mantilla, there is no difference
between the French women themselves and our own; they wear
great masses of false hair, in braids, bunches, and long curls; and
short petticoats, full ones and those with plaits; and shoes with
heels like the point of daggers. The ancient Andalusian costume
has disappeared from the city. (281)

It is not surprising that Spanish romantic writers, faithful followers
of their French models, found evidence of the Arab presence in every corner in which they looked. They assimilated the mechanism
so well, they absorbed the formula so intensely, that when Pedro Antonio de Alarcón disembarked in Morocco in 1859 he had no qualm
in affirming that the authentic Moors were those found in books
and that true reality was what was provided by literature: “Era un
verdadero moro, esto es, un Moro de novela” ‘He was a true Moor,
that is, a Moor from a novel’ (214). At that time the book functioned
similarly to the television of today in that it disseminated a virtual
reality that prevailed over concrete facts and objects. Although the
myth of al-Andalus is not the only element in the construction of
a picturesque and stereotypical landscape sold for its commercial
value, it does represent an important contribution to the formation
of the Spanish image abroad. In and outside of Spain, “the Moorish
element,” the old Muslim presence, typifies the least European and
most foreign and picturesque element of all Spanish history and,
strictly speaking, it is. Or it was, because it is one thing to talk about
the past or study, and an altogether different thing to verify what
does survive from those times and to what extent the past was or
still is alive in our society.
When nineteenth-century Spanish Arabists and historians began publishing their first historical compilations, translations, and
Published by New Prairie Press
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poems from al-Andalus, they knew that society’s environment and
attitudes were adamantly unfavorable towards the historical context they were trying to revive. The materials they brought to light
clashed with the accepted representation of the Spanish nation. On
the contrary, romantic narratives on the same subject were easily
accepted because the fictional nature of the work allowed for greater
freedom and flexibility. In addition, “old Christian” Spanish writers
from the sixteenth and seventeenth-century had already developed
the idealized universe of the novela morisca, the romances fronterizos, and the poesía morisca, depicting quite a different reality from
the regrettable social conditions endured by real Golden Age moriscos. Lacking this artistic advantage, historians and Arabists had to
neutralize the contradictions inherent in their work and reconcile
their admiration for the Catholic Queen with their sympathies towards the moriscos. This explains why, until recently, this group of
professionals had devised various strategies to bring their reconstructions of the past closer to the sensitivities of their contemporary readers. Attempts from historians to Hispanicize (or even Europeanize in certain cases) the Muslims from al-Andalus and their
virtues—tolerance in particular—responds to this strategy. The case
of Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz serves as a good example, given his
known lack of enthusiasm for the Moors:
Otorgaban a la mujer una singular libertad callejera de difícil vinculación con los usos islámicos; lo comprueban algunas noticias
de El collar de la paloma de Ibn Hazm y varias conocidas anécdotas históricas. Y le concedían una consideración y un respeto de
pura estirpe hispánica. Pérès ha señalado la situación dispar de las
mujeres hispanas frente a las orientales. ¿De dónde sino de la herencia temperamental preislámica podía proceder esa gracia, esa
súbita vibración psicológica, esa espontaneidad de Ibn Guzmán
cuyo nombre – Gutmann – y cuya estampa física (era rubio y de
ojos azules) acreditan a las claras su estirpe hispano-goda?
They granted women an exceptional freedom to roam the streets
that is difficult to connect with Islamic customs; it is proven by
some accounts found in Ibn Hazm’s The Dove’s Necklace and several well-known historical anecdotes. And they gave them a con-
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sideration and respect of pure Hispanic stock. Pérès has pointed
out the different situation Hispanic women had with respect to
their oriental counterparts. Whence but from the pre-Islamic
temperamental inheritance could such grace have come, such
sudden psychological vibration, the spontaneity of Ibn Guzman,
whose name—Gutmann—and his physical countenance (he was
blond and blue-eyed) clearly prove his Hispano-Visigothic lineage? (Islam de España 65-66)

According to this, al-Andalus mythical tolerance towards women or
other religions may have been the result of the Hispanic context.
The Arab or Muslim camp, however, emphasized then, as it
does now, the unambiguous Arab character of al-Andalus’s cultural
glories, real or invented. Such tolerance, would demonstrate the
integrationist capability of Islam and its respect for other beliefs.
Both positions coincide with the results they produce: to promote
al-Andalus as a model of tolerance, an island in contemporary Europe that could not be reproduced or found ever again, although
this characterization, from an Arab perspective, does not usually
extend to the rest of the Muslim world, for obvious reasons in my
opinion.
A reasonable approach to the debate would recognize that the
cultural climate of al-Andalus was ever-changing and subject to
specific political and economic conditions that forced the Emirs to
tolerate certain secondary freedoms regarding their subjected minorities—who paid high taxes—while clearly signaling their inferior
status. The famous and much promoted Three Cultures lived in a de
facto apartheid in which communities were close but separate. Each
was governed by perfectly distinct judicial, economic, and social
regimes that allowed, if circumstances so required, bloody persecutions, such as those perpetrated against Christians in the middle
of the ninth century under Abd er Rahman II and against Jews in
the twelfth century. Repression was so prevalent that when the Reconquest reached al-Andalus in the thirteenth century, the region
had been “cleansed” of Christian presence, because of deportations
to Morocco or exoduses to the Christians kingdoms. This conflictive relationship prevailed until Islamic hegemony in the region
declined. What did not seem to wane was its ideology of confronta-
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tion and contempt: in the settlement presented to Alphonse I the
Battler at the surrender of Zaragoza (1118), the Moors demanded
explicitly that no Jew be allowed in a position of authority over a
Muslim. Almost four centuries later, towards the end of 1491, the
Moors of Granada stipulated the same condition in their surrender
to the Catholic Monarchs. And around the same time, Muslim mufí
‘jurisconsult’ al-Wansharisi forbade Muslims to remain in Christian
territories for fear they would end up abandoning Islam, although
there were also opinions to the contrary.
In other aspects of daily life in al-Andalus, the separation and
subjection of religious minorities were the norm: mixed marriages
were forbidden, as well as the riding of stallions in Muslim cities;
there were food restrictions and laws enforcing color-coded clothing with discriminatory ends. In order to be objective and situate
these facts in their context, it is necessary to point out that the same
rules of separation and subjection of minorities were reproduced in
Christian Spain after its triumph over al-Andalus. Having acknowledged that, I emphasize once more that I seek neither to demonize
al-Andalus nor to idealize it. I strive to examine the period with
logical and scientific criteria more adjusted to human realities.
The long period in the history of the Iberian Peninsula known
as al-Andalus deserves to be studied with rigor and remembered
with respect. However, a respectful attitude should not replace
known cultural elements used as “differential facts:” the study and
appreciation of the marvelous Islamic monuments of Spain should
not be manipulated into founding political movements lacking more
substantive platforms. The history of a land—and here we must differentiate the geographical territory from the population inhabiting
that land at a given historical period—should not be taken as the
basis on which to invent differential facts where there are none. To
focus the discussion on a concrete area, let us consider Andalusia,
the territory where Arab “influences” are used most frequently as
differential facts. Appeals to this imagined and imaginary past may
differ in tone—between corny and comic— but usually contain a
significant dose of historical inaccuracy. If such creations were confined solely to a fictional realm, they could be appreciated as good—
or very bad—literature. However, these fictional narratives tend to
“create opinion,” which can only distort our understanding of the
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period. See how a well-known author makes Boabdil the spokesperson of this mystification:
Aquí, en la Andalucía donde nacimos los nazaríes, existió ya
Tartesos, un pueblo cuyas leyes se escribieron en verso, y ni siquiera Roma la civilizó, sino al contrario: Andalucía le dio sus
mejores emperadores y pulió a sus soldados: como le dio luego
al Islam su más lograda arquitectura y su sabiduría literaria y
científica; como le dio a Europa zéjeles y jarchas y moaxajas para
que sus trovadores se inspiraran. En Andalucía – conquistadora
siempre de sus conquistadores, cuanto más de visitantes enamoradizos – convivieron todas las culturas, y en ella se fertilizaron
unas y otras y procrearon. Por culpa de la intransigencia de los
cristianos por un lado y de la intransigencia de los almorávides
por otro, se apagó la hoguera maravillosa de una Península que,
gracias a los andaluces, fue un faro deslumbrante.
Here in Andalusia, where we, Nasris, were born, there was once
a people called Tartessus, whose laws were written as poems, and
not even Rome civilized it; on the contrary: Andalusia gave her its
best emperors and improved its soldiers; it also gave Islam its best
architecture and its literary and scientific wisdom; it gave Europe
zéjeles and xarchas and moaxajas to inspire its troubadours. In
Andalusia—inveterate conqueror of its conquerors as well as of
its enamored visitors—all cultures lived together, cross-fertilized,
and procreated. Christian intransigency on the one hand and the
intransigency of the Almoravids on the other extinguished the
wonderful bonfire of a Peninsula, which, thanks to the Andalusians, was once a dazzling beacon. (Antonio Gala 331)

A wealth of similar examples can be found among many historical novels published in the last twenty years. In most cases, the
ease with which such ignorance is displayed is perplexing. However,
this extraordinary pseudo-cultural movement has been contested
by many historians who have attempted to balance the scales and
reach the general population. Alas, their efforts have met with very
little success, in part because of the limited resources at their disposal. Shortly before his death, Sánchez-Albornoz, whose work has
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been not only misinterpreted but also poorly analyzed and disseminated, attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to contain the avalanche of
disinformation in publications that, unfortunately, failed to reach
the Andalusian readers to whom they were directed. He wrote that
in a trip to the region:
Encontró a Córdoba llena de carteles de propaganda islámica y
se sorprendió de la cesión por el alcalde, para mezquita, del antiguo convento de las Clarisas. El de Granada y varios concejales
se habían negado a participar en la fiesta de la Reconquista de la
ciudad, por entender que se conmemoraba el aniversario de un
día triste de la historia granadina. En Sevilla se habían repartido, al parecer, octavillas protestando por el culto de una “secta”
– la religión católica – responsable del asesinato de millones de
musulmanes andaluces.
He found the city of Córdoba full of Islamic propaganda and was
surprised to learn that the mayor had handed over the site of the
old Clarisa convent to serve as mosque. The mayor of Granada
and several town councilors had refused to participate in the
Reconquest celebrations because they found the anniversary
commemorated a sad event in the history of the city. In Seville,
pamphlets had been distributed to protest the religious practice
of a “sect”—the Catholic religion—responsible for the murders of
millions of Andalusian Muslims. (“Veleidades” 21)

A year later, the historian added:
La imagen de esa España enteramente islamizada que triunfa en
mis sueños era cruelísima. Nunca se había descubierto el Sepulcro de Santiago, no había surgido la leyenda del Apóstol Caballero, no habían tenido lugar las peregrinaciones a Compostela
y la cultura de la Europa cristiana no había pasado el Pirineo.
No se habían escrito ni iluminado las maravillas de los llamados
Beatos. No se habían construido nuestros templos prerrománicos en tierras cantábricas ni los de estilo mozárabe al sur de los
montes, ni después las iglesias y monasterios románicos y góti-
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cos. Nunca se habían alzado las grandes y bellas catedrales de
Santiago, Zamora, Salamanca, León, Burgos, Toledo, Barcelona,
Sevilla… No se habían escrito el Poema del Cid, ni los otros cantares de gesta. No se habían redactado los fueros municipales que
garantizaron las libertades de ciudades y villas. Y no podríamos
recrearnos leyendo al Arcipreste de Hita, a don Juan Manuel, al
Canciller Ayala, (…) después no se habrían escrito la Celestina
ni el Quijote; Lope y Calderón no habrían soñado con legarnos
sus dramas y comedias; Quevedo y Tirso habrían guardado silencio; no habrían pintado el Greco, Velásquez, Goya …, no habría
surgido la leyenda de don Juan (…). Y, como no habríamos conquistado América, ni nuestra lengua ni nuestra cultura tendrían
el vigor y la difusión lograda por las de nuestra España cristiana
(…). No olvidéis, además, que no descendéis de los musulmanes
que otrora poblaron nuestra tierra sino de los cristianos que la
ganaron para la civilización occidental. Sabemos hoy con certeza
documentalmente que Fernando III y Alfonso X expulsaron del
Valle del Guadalquivir a la morisma y que fue repoblada por cristianos del Norte, como todo el país.
The image of a thoroughly Islamic Spain that triumphed in my
dreams was most cruel. The grave of Santiago had never been
found and therefore the legend of the Knight Apostle never existed. There were no pilgrimages to Compostela, nor did the culture of Christian Europe ever cross the Pyrenees. The marvelous
manuscripts of the so-called Beati had not been written or illuminated. Neither the Pre-Romanic churches of Cantabria nor the
Mozarabic temples south of the mountains had been built, nor,
afterwards, the Romanic and Gothic churches and monasteries.
The beautiful great cathedrals of Santiago, Zamora, Salamanca,
León, Burgos, Toledo, Barcelona, and Seville had never been
built. … The poem of Mio Cid and other epic poems were never
written. There were no municipal fueros to guarantee the rights
and freedoms of towns and villages. We would be unable to enjoy
the works of the Archpriest of Hita, don Juan Manuel, Chancellor
Ayala … and afterwards the Celestina or the Quijote would not
had been written. Lope and Calderón would not have dreamed
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their legacy of comedies and dramas. Quevedo and Tirso would
have remained silent. The Greco, Velázquez, and Goya would not
have painted…, the legend of don Juan would not have developed
… And because Spain would not have conquered America, neither our language nor our culture would have had the strength
and dissemination achieved by those of our Christian Spain.
… Moreover, do not forget that you are not descendants of the
Muslims who once peopled our land but of the Christians who
won it for Western civilization. Today we know with documented
certainty that Ferdinand III and Alphonse X expelled the Moors
from the Guadalquivir Valley and the land was repopulated by
Christians from the North, like the rest of the country. (“Sueño
cruel” 14)

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, harmless lyrical exaltations have intensified in tone, from the pseudo-historical nonsense
of Blas Infante to the anti-nationalistic fixation of Juan Goytisolo,
who, not long ago, was stoking the same fires:
El enfrentamiento del castellanismo más mostrenco con las nacionalidades periféricas nos retrotrae a épocas que creíamos definitivamente extintas … como dijo Américo Castro, un grupo
humano que ignora de dónde viene tampoco puede saber a
dónde va. A los mitos mortíferos de los radicales vascos, hacen
eco, como ladridos de un can en la noche, los del españolismo
más trasnochado. Volvemos insidiosamente a la apropiación estatal de lo religioso y a las arengas de la patria en peligro.
The confrontation of the dullest Castilianism with peripheral nationalisms takes us back to an era that we thought definitively
extinct … as Américo Castro said, a human group that ignores
where it comes from cannot know where it goes. The deadly
myths of Basque radicalism are echoed, like dogs barking in the
night, by the most rancid españolismo. We return insidiously to
the State appropriation of the religious and to the sermons of the
country in danger. (5)

I do not know what Goytisolo means by “the dullest Castilianism”
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or “the most rancid españolismo.” I cannot find them anywhere: he
publishes in all kinds of newspapers, ABC included, a reflection of
the tolerant attitude of both sides. Additionally, it would behoove
him to keep in mind his own words regarding where he comes from:
definitely not from the Abd er-Rahmans.
The proliferation of theoreticians and defenders of the al-Andalus cause only proves that the country is experiencing a trend in
fashionable opinion, a politics of gestures easy to adhere to because
it does not cost anyone anything. The pervasiveness of the stereotypical discourse towards the “Three Cultures” or towards Muslim
immigrants has invaded and conquered the mass media to such an
extent that we can only find either exaggeration (if there are positive
things to report) or silence (if the issue is negative). Reporters seem
morally obligated to omit any criticism of such immigrants, even if
there are reasons for it, to avoid being characterized as racists, while
at the same time they feel compelled to praise the benefits brought
about by these foreigners, which in some cases are true and in others, not exactly. There are no subtleties in the discourse. Finally, Tibi
effectively synthesizes the historical character of al-Andalus: “Islam
was the culture of Arab Spain and Arabic was its language. No such
thing as cultural relativism existed there” (“Muslim Migrants” 46).
In recent years, the uses of the andalusí past as a rhetorical
platform has crossed paths with the PSOE’s foreign policy and José
Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s chimeric “Alliance of Civilizations.” The
government assures us that the policy touches upon national security, political cooperation, and education. Yet the question remains:
what does Spain get in return? We do know exactly what we offer:
generous residency permits, promotion of Islam gratis et amore in
our lands, productive investments, unrecoverable loans, dazzling
super sales that are never paid up; even a series of concessions that
may affect our national security and sovereignty. What is the worth
of the pompous statements on the Hispano-Arab brotherhood and
the glories of al-Andalus made by a Saudi, Egyptian, or Syrian minister? Will they authorize without restrictions Christian proselytism
in all Muslim countries? Will they abolish the family laws currently
in force in their lands? Will they revise their History textbooks?
It does not appear that any of the above is likely to occur. The
lack of reciprocity is the habitual norm in how Muslim nations
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conduct their affairs with other communities. A single example
will be enough. At one of the countless religion forums currently
in existence in Spain, the Muslim representative, Riay Tatari, paid
the usual compliments to Islam: “no hay religión en el mundo que
propague la paz como el Islam” ‘there is no religion in this world
that propagates peace like Islam;’ “El Islam da la mano a todas las
religiones que llamamos a un único Dios” ‘ Islam extends its hands
to all religions that call God the One and Only;’ “Nunca se ha interrumpido la convivencia de los musulmanes con las otras religiones,
porque en el Corán tienen su lugar y su respeto” ‘There has never
been an interruption of the conviviality of Muslims with other religions because they have their place and their due respect in the Koran’ (“Encuentro de religiones” ‘Meeting of religions’ 36). Of course,
when asked why Saudi Arabia forbids the dissemination of other
religions except Islam, he replied: “Si allí no hay otra religión, no
veo por qué vamos a crear un problema donde no lo hay” ‘If there is
no other religion over there, I do not see why we are going to create
a problem where there is none’ (36). Enough said; except that a few
days later, the same person requested funds from the Spanish government to support courses on Islamic religion in Spanish elementary schools. In due time, he received what he wanted.
Notes
1 Translator’s Note: Unless otherwise noted, all translations of the secondary
sources are mine.
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